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COMMUNITY PROPERTY-TRANSMUTATION OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY: A PREFERENCE FOR JOINT TENANCY IN NEW
MEXICO? Estate of Fletcherv. Jackson, 94 N.M. 572, 613 P.2d 714
(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980).

The Community Property Act of 1973' incorporates changes in
the former New Mexico law which the legislature believed were mandated by the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment to the New
Mexico Constitution.2 Although the stated purpose of the Act was
to make "the provisions of the community property law of New
Mexico apply equally to all persons regardless of sex," 3 commentary
on the Act indicates that the drafters also sought to clear up longstanding and difficult questions about New Mexico's community
property law. 4
Transmutation of community property is one area which presents
such questions. One of the most difficult of these questions arises
after the death of one member of the marital community: whether
or not the inter vivos acts of the husband and wife were sufficient to
transmute community property into another form of tenancy, such
as joint tenancy with right of survivorship. This was the question before the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Estate of Fletcher v. Jackson.' If the community property in question had been transmuted
into joint tenancy, the surviving spouse became the sole owner
through the built-in testamentary disposition of that tenancy. 6 If the
property had not been transmuted, the decedent's one-half interest
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 40-3-6 to -17 (1978).
2. The Equal Rights Amendment, N.M. Const. art. 2, § 18, was passed November 7,
1972, and became effective July 1, 1973, the effective date of the Community Property
Act of 1973. For a detailed discussion of the Act, see Bingaman, The Community Property
Act of 1973: A Commentary and Quasi-LegislativeHistory, 5 N.M.L. Rev. 1 (1974) thereinafter cited as Bingaman].
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-7 (1978).
4. Bingaman, supra note 2, at 51.
5. 94 N.M. 572, 613 P.2d 714 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991
(1980).
6. Although joint tenancy is denominated as one of the legal estates by which persons
may hold property in New Mexico, it is not defined by New Mexico statute. See N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 40-3-8(A)(6) (1978).
The most important characteristic of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship or jus accrescendi. On the death of one of the joint tenants his interest
does not descend to his heirs or pass under his will; the entire ownership remains in the surviving joint tenants. The interest of the deceased joint tenant
disappears and the whole estate continues in the surviving tenants or tenant.
C. Moynihan, Introduction to the Law of Real Property 220 (1962).
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in the community property was properly includable in the probate
estate, and, in the case of Estate of Fletcher,was distributable under
the decedent's will. 7
Notwithstanding the long history of litigation on the question of
when a transmutation of community property has occurred, the
court of appeals faced a difficult task in Estate of Fletcher.The precise questions presented in Estate of Fletcher had not been considered in any prior case. Existing case law provides some insight into
what acts may be sufficient to effect a transmutation and how they
may be proved; however, no statutory provision states expressly
which acts are required, 8 despite the intent of the drafters of the
Community Property Act of 1973 to require a writing between
spouses to transmute community property. The drafters believed
that such a requirement was established by the Act in what is now
section 40-3-8(A)(5) of the New Mexico statutes, which provides
that "separate property" means "property designated as separate
property by a written agreement between the spouses." 9
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-804(A) (1978) provides: "Upon the death of either spouse,
one-half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse and the other half is
subject to the testamentary disposition of the decedent."
This has not always been the case in New Mexico, as explained in Bingaman, The Impact
of the Equal Rights Amendment on Married Women's FinancialIndividual Rights, 3 Pepperdine L. Rev. 26, 36 n. 26 (1975):
Wives in New Mexico acquired this right only after passage of an Equal
Rights Amendment to the State Constitution, effective July 1, 1973. The
Amendment required repeal of former N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-8 (1953),
which denied wives the right to will their halves of the community upon predeceasing their husbands while N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-9 (1953) gave husbands such a right. New Mexico was the only community property state which
ever had such a provision.
(Emphasis added).
8. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-8(A)(5) (1978). For a discussion of this statute, see note 8,
infra. See also N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-2 (1978), which provides:
Either husband or wife may enter into any engagement or transaction with
the other, or with any other person respecting property, which either might, if
unmarried; subject, in transactions between themselves, to the general rules of
common law which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-1-16 (1978), also provides that:
An instrument conveying or transferring title to real or personal property to
two or more persons as joint tenants, to two or more persons and to the survivors of them and the heirs and assigns of the survivor, or to two or more persons with right of survivorship, shall be prima facie evidence that such property is held in a joint tenancy and shall be conclusive as to purchasers or
encumbrancers for value. In any litigation involving the issue of such tenancy
a preponderance of the evidence shall be sufficient to establish the same.
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-8(A)(5) (1978). Such was the express intent of the drafters
according to Bingaman, who said this new section of the Act modified N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ § 57-2-6, -12 (1953) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann § § 40-2-2, -8 (1978)), which re-
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The result in Estate of Fletcher and the analysis and reasoning of
the court of appeals significantly affect the resolution of issues of
For example, identification of the
transmutation in New Mexico.'
property to be included in or excluded from the probate estates of
New Mexico citizens is affected. Of even greater consequence may be

the impact of the case on the strength of the community property
presumption in New Mexico. 1 1 This Note examines the litigation in
Estate of Fletcher,provides an historical context in which to analyze
the reasoning of the court of appeals, and discusses the inconsistency
of New Mexico statutory provisions and case law in light of the result
in Fletcher.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
When Neutie Fletcher died on July 4, 1977, she had been married
to John J. Fletcher, Jr. for almost thirty-eight years.' 2 There were
no children of this long marriage, but Neutie had two sons from her
previous marriage.' ' Neutie made a specific bequest to John (Appelmain in effect otherwise, by requiring that for transmutation of property between spouses,
that:
such agreements between the spouses must be in writing, a requirement which
was added to prevent misunderstandings and the possibility of fraud. If an
agreement to transmute community property into the separate property
[which by definition includes joint tenancy, see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-8(A)
(6) (1978)] of one or both spouses was not written at the time it was made,
the spouses are free to reduce the agreement to writing at a later time. If they
subsequently cannot agree either as to the existence of the agreement or to its
terms, this subsection leaves the property in question as community property.
Such a result seems fairer to both spouses than does placing on one of them
the risk of losing all interest in the property in a later court test, the outcome
of which could depend only upon testimony involving differing recollections
of a past oral agreement.
Bingaman, supra note 1, at 5-6. Bingaman was a member of the State Bar Committee which
provided the first proposed draft of the new Act to the legislature.
10. This is particularly true because the supreme court denied certiorari.
11. New Mexico statutes provide that community property is any property acquired
during marriage by either or both spouses which is not separate property. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 40-3-8(B) (1978).
New Mexico case law has established a rebuttable presumption that all property acquired
during marriage is community property of that marriage, including income received by the
husband alone. See Moore v. Moore, 71 N.M. 495, 379 P.2d 784 (1963); Campbell v. Campbell, 62 N.M. 330, 310 P.2d 266 (1957) (both decided under former law, prior to the Community Property Act of 1973). The characterization of pension rights and retirement benefits as community property has also been upheld. See Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409,
575 P.2d 99 (1978).
12. 94 N.M. at 573, 613 P.2d at 715. Neutie and John were married in 1939 in Texas, a
community property state, where they continued to live until 1961, when they moved to
New Mexico. See Transcript of Proceedings, at 2, Estate of Fletcher v. Jackson, 94 N.M.
572, 613 P.2d 714 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980).
13. John also had a son by a previous marriage, but this son's interests did not present
any issue in this litigation. See Transcript of Proceedings, at 92.
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lee) in her will executed February 19, 1977, but bequeathed and devised the residue of her estate to her two sons, William R. and Robert
T. Jackson (Appellants)." Although Neutie and John had extensive
holdings in stocks and securities,' s Neutie's will was "devoid of any
mention of [specific] disposition" of these assets.' 6 Most of the
stock owned by Neutie and John was held as community property
with John as the only owner of record, but a small portion of their
extensive holdings had been held in joint tenancy.' 7
The ensuing dispute between Neutie's two sons and John involved
the characterization of ownership for 1718 shares of Standard Oil
Co. of Indiana, which Neutie and John had "accumulated as part of
a 'savings' or 'retirement' program with his employer."' a When originally issued, the certificates for these shares bore only John's name;
nonetheless, they were indisputably community property at the time
'

14. The existenc6 of this will and the nature of the specific bequest, "$10 and a life
estate in the house and furnishings," was apparently something of a shock to John. He did
not know of the existence of the February 1977 will until after Neutie died. 94 N.M. at
575-76, 580, 613 P.2d at 717-18, 722. However, John was aware of the contents of Neutie's
prior will, executed in 1964, in which she had devised and bequeathed all of her property
"real, personal and mixed, and of every description whatsoever, and wherever situated," to
her sons. Transcript of Proceedings, at 87. In a 1976 codicil, Neutie modified this 1964 will
to leave John "all my equity of our house, being our home, and all furnishings... ," but
everything else still went to her sons. Id. at 85.
15. The Transcript of the Record, at 36-40, Estate of Fletcher v. Jackson, 94 N.M. 572,
613 P.2d 714 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615 P.2d 991 (1980), shows holdings
of over 9,000 shares of assorted stocks and securities, including the contested 1,718 shares
of Standard Oil of Indiana.
16. 94 N.M. at 580, 613 P.2d at 722 (Sutin, J., dissenting). The attorney who drafted
the 1977 will was never called as a witness. This will can be found in the Transcript of the
Record, at 4-6.
A 1964 letter from Neutie to her daughter-in-law may provide some insight into Neutie's
acceptance of a will so obviously lacking in necessary detail; writing about her 1964 will, she
said, it was "too much and too expensive to itemize each little thing." Transcript of Proceedings, at 80.
17. The Transcript of the Record, at 36-40, indicates that 1,918 shares of Standard Oil
of Indiana, including the disputed 1,718 shares, were recorded as joint tenancy stock when
Neutie died. Approximately 7,826 other less valuable shares, recorded in the name of John,
were identified as community property. The inventory and accounting made by Neutie's
executor shows division of these latter shares, or the proceeds of their sale, one-half to John
and one-half to Neutie's sons. Transcript of the Record, at 45-60.
It is difficult for this writer to agree that John's 1976 will and Neutie's 1976 codicil to
her 1964 will were "consistent with joint tenancy estate planning." 94 N.M. at 576, 613
P.2d at 718. In these wills, John and Neutie each left nearly all of their respective estates to
Neutie's sons. In addition, John and Neutie's stock and security dealings for over thirty-five
years seem inconsistent with joint tenancy estate planning. They always held the majority
of their stock and securities as community property. Indeed, John testified that other than
the Standard Oil of Indiana stock, he and Neutie had never put any stock into joint tenancy.
Transcript of Proceedings, at 20.
18. 94 N.M. at 574, 613 P.2d at 716. John received the accumulated 1,718 shares from
his employer in a two-part disposition, some on May 9, 1973 and some on December 16,
1974. Id. at 580, 613 P.2d at 722 (Sutin, J., dissenting).
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they were issued.' I Neutie's one-half interest in these shares would
have passed to her sons under the residuary provisions of her probated will. 2 0 However, John claimed that the shares were actually
held in joint tenancy and therefore were now his sole and separate
property. Indeed, newly issued certificates in John's possession bore
the names of Neutie and John as joint tenants. Eight months before
her death, John had sent the old certificates to transfer agents and
requested that the certificates be reissued as shares held in joint tenancy. 2' Only John endorsed the old certificates;2 2 only he signed
the letters of request. 2 3
John testified to both Neutie's prior oral agreement and her subsequent oral ratification of his actions in having the shares reissued in
joint tenancy.2 4 He said that joint tenancy in these 1718 shares was
part of their marital estate plan.2 s In support of his statements, John
presented two dividend checks on the reissued shares, both showing
Neutie and John as joint tenants. Neutie had co-endorsed both
2
checks. 6
19. 94 N.M. at 574, 613 P.2d at 716.
20. The shares would also have passed to Neutie's sons under the provision of her prior
will. See note 16 supra.
21. John was aware that Neutie was dying of cancer before November 5, 1976, the day
he sent the first certificates to the First National Bank of Chicago, transfer agent for Standard Oil of Indiana. He sent the last certificate on November 15, 1976. Transcript of Proceedings, at 111-12.
22. Under U.C.C. § 8-404 (1972 version), the transfer agent was under no duty to inquire into the possible existence of claims adverse to the requested transfer because the certificated security was appropriately endorsed and the instruction to transfer came from an
appropriate person, here the registered owner.
23. See Transcript of Proceedings, at 111-12.
24. The trial court's letter decision said that these alleged conversations were not considered in reaching its holding. 94 N.M. at 575, 613 P.2d at 717. See also Transcript of Proceedings, at 21-23.
25. John testified that he and Neutie had put their savings, their checking accounts,
their home and the Standard Oil of Indiana stock into joint tenancy as a "base rock of
financial stability" for the survivor of them. Transcript of Proceedings, at 13. Compare this
testimony to Neutie's 1977 will in which she expressly reserved and granted a life estate in
their home to John, remainder to her sons. Transcript of the Record, at 4. Then consider
that the 1967 deed to the house reflected a joint tenancy. At least two conclusions follow:
(1) The attorney who drafted Neutie's 1977 will did not know that the house was held in
joint tenancy; or (2) Neutie did not know that the house was held in joint tenancy, or if she
did, she did not understand that joint tenancy precluded her testmantary disposition of her
interest in the property.
26. Neutie co-endorsed only the larger two of four dividend checks on the Standard Oil
of Indiana stock (two dated December 10, 1976 for $735.43 and $389.28, and two dated
March 10, 1977 for $1,246.70 and $24.70). The larger checks were drawn to Neutie and
John as joint tenants; the smaller were drawn only in John's name. Transcript of Proceedings, at 114-17.
If the checks were accompanied by documents detailing the number of shares that each
check represented, such documents are not in the record. Before John transferred the disputed 1,718 shares into joint tenancy, he and Neutie had held 200 shares of Standard Oil of
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Neutie's sons testified that past correspondence and discussions
with Neutie and John had led them to believe that Neutie's interest
in these shares was to pass to them. 2 7 The sons further contended
that transmutation of community property into separate property,
including property held in joint tenancy, could not legally be effected
under the Community Property Act of 1973 absent a written agreement between the spouses.' 8 Rejecting that argument, the trial court
found that transmutation had been established by "clear, strong and
convincing evidence." 29 The court of appeals affirmed.
CONTEXT FOR ANALYSIS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF TRANSMUTATION
IN NEW MEXICO

Transmutation is "a broad term used to describe arrangements between spouses which change the character of their property."3 Once
the initial legal status of any property held by married persons is determined, any attempt to change that legal status raises a transmutation question. 3
Section 40-2-2 of the New Mexico statutes, which provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]ither husband or wife may enter into any
engagement or transaction with the other, or with any other person
respecting property, which either might, if unmarried, ' 3 2 made 3its3
appearance early in the history of New Mexico. Enacted in 1907,
this provision has never been amended. Except in two cases subsequently overruled by the New Mexico Supreme Court, 3 4 this statute
consistently has been interpreted as recognizing the power of spouses
Indiana as joint tenants and 1,756 shares as community property. After the transfers initiated by John there were still 38 shares held as community property. While Neutie's coendorsements indicate that she knew or should have known that some shares were held in
joint tenancy, they do not necessarily indicate that she knew how many shares were so held.
27. Transcript of Proceedings, at 52-54.
28. 94 N.M. at 579, 613 P.2d at 721. Appellants' Brief in Chief, at 6-7, Estate of
Fletcher v. Jackson, 94 N.M. 572, 613 P.2d 714 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 94 N.M. 674, 615
P.2d 991 (1980).
29. 94 N.M. at 574-75, 613 P.2d at 716-17.
30. W. Reppy, Jr., & W. de Funiak, Community Property in the United States 421
(1975).
31. See Gillespie v. Gillespie, 84 N.M. 618, 506 P.2d 775 (1973) (cited in 94 N.M. at
578, 613 P.2d at 720).
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-2 (1978).
33. 1907 N.M. Laws, ch. 37, § 4. Such provisions were "largely taken from California."
Beals v. Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 491, 185 P. 780, 790 (1919). In fact, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-2
(1978) is still virtually identical to the California provision, Cal. Civ. Code § 5103 (West
1970).
34. Newton v. Wilson, 53 N.M. 480, 211 P.2d 776 (1949); MacDonald v. Lambert, 43
N.M. 27, 85 P.2d 78 (1938). Both were overruled by Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244
P.2d 781 (1952). See text accompanying notes 35-44 infra.
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to agree to change the legal status by which they hold their property.3
In Estate of Fletcher, therefore, the issue is not one of power, but
one of proof: whether a writing signed by both spouses is required to
transmute community property. In 1907, when section 40-2-2 was
enacted, the answer clearly would have been yes. The 1907 statute
provided:
The husband has the management and control of the community
property, with the like absolute power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate: provided, however, that
he cannot make a gift of such community property, or convey the
same without valuable consideration,unless the wife, in writing, consent thereto... 36

The issue of how transmutation should be proved was first considered by the New Mexico Supreme Court in MacDonald v. Lambert,37 which has been charitably characterized as "severely limit[ing] the power of husband and wife to transmute property."' 3 8 The
decision in MacDonald seems to have been a reaction against contemporary California cases extending proof of transmutation to include
oral agreements between spouses. However, instead of merely finding
that a writing was required to transmute property between spouses,
the MacDonald court went on to consider the question of the power
of spouses to transmute their property, a question not presented by
the case on appeal. 9 Justice Sadler, the lone dissenter in MacDonald,
characterized the majority opinion as holding that
35. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 84 N.M. 618, 506 P.2d 775 (1973);Wiggins v. Rush, 83 N.M.
133, 489 P.2d 641 (1971); Le Clert v. Le Clert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969); Thaxton v. Thaxton, 75 N.M. 450, 405 P.2d 932 (1965); Burlingham v. Burlingham, 72 N.M.
433, 384 P.2d 699 (1963); Campbell v. Campbell, 62 N.M. 330, 310 P.2d 266 (1957);
Shanafelt v. Holloman, 61 N.M. 147, 296 P.2d 752 (1956); In re Trimble's Estate, 57 N.M.
51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953); Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952); Beals v.
Ares, 25 N.M. 459, 185 P. 780 (1919). This power has been recognized by the general body
of community property law for approximately thirteen centuries. See Vaughn, The Policy
of Community Property and Inter-Spousal Transactions, 19 Baylor L. Rev. 20, at 29-30
(1967).
36. 1907 N.M. Laws, ch. 37, § 16 (emphasis added). Substantial rewording in 1915 resulted in an aggrandizement of the power of the husband with respect to the personal property of the community, making his sole power of disposition facially absolute. 1915 N.M.
Code, § 2766; 1915 N.M. Laws, ch. 84, § 1. 1927 N.M. Laws, ch. 84, § I added a final
clause, "except, that the husband may convey directly to the wife or the wife to the husband without the other joining in the conveyance."
37. 43.N.M. 27, 85 P.2d 78 (1938).
38. 94 N.M. at 574, 613 P.2d at 716.
39. For insight into the conflicting characterizations of the issue on appeal, compare the
majority opinion, 43 N.M. at 33, 85 P.2d at 80, with the dissent of Justice Sadler, 43 N.M.
at 40-41, 85 P.2d at 85.
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there is no law in New Mexico authorizing husband and wife, either
orally or in writing, to transmute separate estate into community
property, or vice versa; that the law fixes immutably the status of
such property tested by the means of its acquisition and that the
parties are powerless to change it. 4 0

This characterization of MacDonald was adopted by the supreme
court in the later case of Newton v. Wilson,4 1 which expressly held
that spouses had no power to transmute their property, even if they
executed a written contract. Justice Sadler again dissented.
In MacDonald and Newton, the supreme court confused the fundamental issues of power and proof in transmutation questions. This
confusion was not substantially alleviated by Chavez v. Chavez,4 2 in
which the supreme court expressly overruled those two cases. 4 The
Chavez court simply adopted Justice Sadler's dissents from MacDonald and Newton and restated the statutory text of what is now section 4 0-2-2. 4 * The court did not, unfortunately, clear up the critical
question of whether a writing is required to effect a transmutation of
community property. The court merely established that "[p] roof to
support... transmutation must be clear, strong and convincing; a
mere preponderance of the evidence will not suffice to effect it."" 5
The Chavez evidentiary standard was subsequently applied in the
better-known case In re Trimble's Estate4 6 and has, therefore, become known as the Trimble Rule. In Trimble the court held that a
deed alone was not clear, strong and convincing proof that real property was to be held in joint tenancy when the decedent's widow testified that she had always believed that the realty was community
property. 4
43 N.M. at 38, 85 P.2d at 83.
53 N.M. 480, 211 P.2d 776 (1949).
56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952). Justice McGhee, author for the majority, wrote
majority in Newton. He was the trial court judge in MacDonald.
56 N.M. at 396, 244 P.2d at 782.
The holding reads:
We adopt the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Sadler in each case so far as
they state his construction of the statute, Sec. 65-206, N.M.S.A. 1941 Comp.
[current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-2 (1978)], declaring either husband or wife may enter into any engagement or transaction with the other, or
with any other person respecting property, which either might, if unmarried,
subject, in transactions between themselves to the general rules of common
law which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with
each other.
56 N.M. at 396-97, 244 P.2d at 783. See text of section at note 7 supra. The wording remains unchanged.
45. 56 N.M. at 397, 244 P.2d at 783.
46. 57 N.M. 51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953).
47. Id. at 55-56, 63-64, 253 P.2d at 809.

40.
41.
42.
for the
43.
44.
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ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION IN ESTATE OF FLETCHER

Not surprisingly, the court of appeals in Estate of Fletcher held
that the Community Property Act of 1973 did not impose any pro48
hibition on the power of spouses to transmute their property.
However, the court also held that the Act did not impose any additional requirements to effect a transmutation; specifically, the court
did not establish the requirement of a writing by
held that the4 Act
9
both spouses.
Additionally, the court held that the Act did not affect the evidentiary requirements set forth in section 47-1-16, which provides that:
48. No New Mexico statutory provision has ever been construed as completely prohibiting transmutation. In MacDonald v. Lambert, 43 N.M. 27, 85 P.2d 78 (1938), the trial court
held the oral contract void because a statutory provision required a writing to support a
marriage settlement agreement, but the supreme court affirmed on the grounds that the conversations between the spouses were too indefinite to support a contract. Only the dissent
of Justice Sadler characterized the decision as completely prohibiting transmutation. See
text accompanying notes 36-44 supra. On the other hand, there was a written contract in
Newton v. Wilson, 53 N.M. 480, 211 P.2d 776 (1949), but in Newton, the supreme court
found that the wife had signed the contract without the benefit of independent legal advice.
Again the lone dissenter, Justice Sadler said that the Newton decision "upholds the power
to transmute commingled separate estate into community property, irrespective of the intent on the part of the spouses, and yet denies their right under our statute to accomplish
the same result, absent the element of commingling." Id. at 487, 211 P.2d at 780.
49. The court of appeals ignored Bingaman's commentary on legislative intent, Bingaman, supra note 1, at 5-6, reaching a result which perforce indulges in some judicial slight
of hand. 94 N.M. at 580, 613 P.2d at 722. The court of appeals reasoned as follows:
The heading of § 40-3-8, supra, is "Classes of property" and this heading was
Section 40-3-8 . . . by its terms, deals with
enacted by the Legislature ....
classes of property and not with how property may be changed to a different
class. If as Bingaman... contends, an agreement between spouses, to transmute property "must be in writing" then, absent such a writing, a gift of separate property, from one spouse to the other, or a gift by the community to
one spouse would not be effective. The gift provision, § 40-3-8(A)(4)...
makes no reference to a writing. The cotenancy provision, § 40-3-8(A)(6) ...
which declares as separate property each spouse's undivided interest as a joint
tenant or tenant in common, does not state that such cotenancies, as between
spouses, may only be established by their written agreement. Section 40-3-8
(D) ... states that the right to hold property, as joint tenants, is not altered
by the Community Property Act of 1973 except as provided in sections not
applicable to this case.
Section 40-3-8(A) . . . defines separate property; § 40-3-8(A)(5) ... permits spouses to agree in writing that certain property is separate property.
Such an agreement might affect a transmutation, but this is no more than an
indirect consequence of the statutory definition; § 40-3-8 ... does not deal
directly with the transmutation issue, as Bingaman ... recognizes at page 24
(note 50) and page 51.
Bingaman, supra note 1, wrote at note 50:
Not affected by the new act is the question of the quantum of evidence necessary to establish that property which was held by the spouses as community
property has been transmuted by them to a joint tenancy, a separate property
interest of each under § 57-4A-2(A)(6) [now N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-3-8(A)'
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An instrument conveying or transferring title to real or personal
property to two or more persons as joint tenants ... shall be prima
facie evidence that such property is held in a joint tenancy.... In
any litigation involving the issue of such tenancy a preponderance of
5
the evidence shall be sufficient to establish the same. 0

The court concluded that this statute "[b] y its wording, applies in
determining whether the initial legal status of property was joint tenancy and in determining whether the original legal status has been
changed to joint tenancy. ' ' s 1 The effect of this holding is that the
Chavez-Trimble requirement of clear, strong and convincing evidence
is applicable to all transmutations of property except transmutations
into joint tenancy.
The court took no credit for changing the scope of application of
the Chavez-Trimble evidentiary standard, even though the court had
itself characterized the issue in Estate of Fletcher as primarily one of
proof and not of power. The court found that the enactment of section 47-1-16 was intended to change the applicability of the ChavezTrimble evidentiary standard for transmutation of property into joint
tenancy.5 2 Without pausing, the court then expressly held that the
Community Property Act of 1973 did not legislatively change "the
Trimble requirement applicable to transmutations not covered by
§ 47-1-16.", 3
To summarize, the court of appeals found that the New Mexico
statutes and case law combine to create a confusing state of affairs.
Transmutations from community to joint tenancy can be established
by a preponderance of the evidence, while transmutation from joint
(6)] .... see also Burlingham v. Burlingham, 72 N.M. 433, 384 P.2d 699
(1963), which held that "clear and convincing" evidence, not a "mere preponderance," was necessary to establish that a wife's separate property had been
transmuted to community property.
The difficult question presented by these decisions are not dealt with in the
new act. Whatever quantum of proof was necessary under former case law to
establish transmutation will also be necessary under the new act.
In concluding her commentary on the Act, Bingaman wrote that: "Obviously, many
problems were left untouched: the transmutation question in New Mexico." Bingaman,
supra note 1, at 51. This writer believes that this comment refers to quantum of proof problems and other problems, such as transmutations by commingling, and not to the issue of
whether a writing between the spouses is required to transmute their property whose original legal status is identifiable.
Further, the gift provision of the Act need not be construed as inconsistent with the requirement of a writing between the spouses. The gift provision is consistent if it is construed
to concern gifts from third parties and not gifts between spouses, which are transmutations
of property.
50. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 47-1-16 (1978).
51. 94 N.M. at 578, 613 P.2d at 720 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 580, 613 P.2d at 722.
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tenancy to community property, from community to separate property other than joint tenancy property, and from separate to community property must still be "established by clear, strong and conevidence." ' 4
vincing proof-more than a mere preponderance of the
The ease with which property may be transmuted from community property into joint tenancy does not stem from a preference for
joint tenancy over community property in the laws of New Mexico;
quite the contrary, the prevailing presumption has been one of community ownership." s If the ease of transmuting property into joint
tenancy which the court of appeals found in section 47-1-16 stems
s
from a policy of freedom to contract, 6 then it is reasonable to criticize both the court and the legislature for not advocating and impleto and from other
menting that policy by making transmutation
5 7
accomplish.
to
easy
as
tenancies
of
types
It is significant that the fiduciary obligations of spouses to each
other apparently were not considered by the court of appeals in
reaching its holding in Estate of Fletcher. Section 40-2-2, the statute
providing or acknowledging the power of spouses to transmute their
property, is not an unlimited franchise for husband and wife to enter
into such agreements; rather, the statute expressly subjects their transactions "to the general rules of common law which control the actions
'
of persons occupying confidential relations with each other." 8 Yet
in Estate of Fletcher the court of5 appeals initially stated that it was
"not concerned" with these rules. 9 Later, in dismissing the notion
54. This is the Chavez-Trimble requirement. See text accompanying notes 43 and 44,
supra.
55. See note l0supra.
56. See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
57. Reppy & de Funiak, supra note 29, at 421. At least one early California case held
that a joint tenancy in personal property could be created by oral agreement transferring
title to two persons as joint tenants, and that husband and wife might enter into a binding
agreement that any certain property shall thereafter be held in joint tenancy. Young v.
Young, 126 Cal. App. 306, 14 P.2d 580 (1932) (decided prior to a 1935 amendment to the
California Civil Code expressly requiring a writing to transmute property into joint tenancy). Recent California cases hold, however, that a joint tenancy in either realty or personalty cannot be created by oral agreement. See Donovan v. Donovan, 223 Cal. App. 2d 691,
36 Cal Rptr. 225 (1963). Previously, in Berlv. Rosenberg, 169 Cal. App. 2d 125, 336 P.2d
975 (1959), a case involving the creation of a joint tenancy in securities, the court of appeals held:
The method of creating a joint tenancy is set forth in section 683 of the Civil
Code. In interpreting that section it has been held that a joint tenancy in personal property can only be created by a writing (California Trust Co. v. Bennett, 33 Cal.2d 694, 204 P.2d 324) and that the intention to create a joint
tenancy must be specifically set forth in the writing.
, 336 P.2d at 980.
Id. at __
58. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40-2-2 (1978). See note 7 supra.
59. 94 N.M. at 574, 613 P.2d at 716.
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that a written agreement should be required, the court stated that
"the protection against fraud is in the requirement of § 40-2-2...
subjecting transactions between spouses to common law rules controlling actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each
other."6

0

In the first half of this century, in Trigg v. Trigg, 6 the New Mexico Supreme Court examined the rules of common law which it
found applicable to actions of persons in confidential relations, and
the effect of equity upon the burden of proof when considering conveyances of property between husband and wife. The supreme court
stated the rule as follows:
While neither equity nor law denies the possibility of valid conveyances between husband and wife, yet whenever one of the parties
obtains a possible benefit thereby, equity raises a presumption
against its validity, and casts upon the one asserting it the burden of
proving affirmatively his compliance6 2with the equitable requisites in
order to overcome the presumption.
In the more recent case of Trujillo v. Padilla,6 such an equitable
presumption against the validity of the transaction between the
spouses was raised because "the wife did not have competent and independent legal advice in conferring benefits upon the husband." '6 4
The supreme court found that the very nature and existence of a
fiduciary relationship between the spouses affected the burden of
proof to be applied. It said:
* * * We are now to view fiduciary relations under an entirely different aspect; there is no intentional concealment, no misrepresenta-

tion, no actual fraud. The doctrine to be examined arises from the
very conception and existence of a fiduciary relation. While equity
does not deny the possibility of valid transactions between the two
parties, yet because every fiduciary relation implies a condition of

superiority held by one of the parties over the other, in every transaction between them by which the superior party obtains a possible
benefit, equity raises a presumption against its validity, and casts
upon that party the burden of proving affirmatively its compliance

with equitable requisites, and of thereby overcoming the presumption.6-s
60. Id. at 579, 613 P.2d at 721.
61. 37 N.M. 296, 22P.2d 119(1933).
62. Id. at 299-300, 22 P.2d at 121, quoting 3 Thompson on Real Property, § 2823
(1923).
63. 79 N.M. 245, 442 P.2d 203 (1968).
64. Id. at 248, 442 P.2d at 206.
65. Id. at 248-49, 442 P.2d at 206-07, quoting 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 956
(5th ed. 1971).
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In light of these equitable notions applicable to conveyances of
property between husband and wife, and without regard to whether
section 40-3-8(A)(5) of the Act requires a writing to transmute community property, the court of appeals erred in Estate of Fletcher
when it placed the burden of persuasion on Neutie's two sons rather
than on her husband. The sons should not have had to disprove the
alleged oral agreement and ratification between Neutie and John,
notwithstanding the fact that the documents evidencing transfer of
the stock into joint tenancy were acceptable as prima facie evidence
under section 47-1-16. This statute should be construed to apply to
the initial legal status of property but not to transmutations of the
initial legal status to another status by husbands and wives. If it is
not read in this way, the general rules of common law which the
supreme court has found applicable to control the actions between
persons occupying confidential relations with each other will offer
little or no protection in transactions between spouses. The dissent in
Estate of Fletcher was correct; the reissued stock certificates should
not have been considered a muniment of title sufficient to establish a
transmutation of community property into joint tenancy. 6 6
CONCLUSION

The cardinal precept of the community property system is equality. 6 Embodying this precept,
the community property system shows two essential characteristics:
(1) the transmissability of the wife's interest to her heirs, so if the
wife dies first, her heirs take the share to which she would have been
the marientitled if she had survived; and (2) during the existence 6of
8
tal relationship the spouses are joint owners, or partners.

The creation of inequality or inequity between spouses, even at
death, is inconsistent with the fundamental notions of community
property.
The decision of the court of appeals in Estate of Fletcher illustrates how specific inequalities and inequities can arise in the face of
documented conscious legislative efforts to preclude them. The Community Property Act of 1973 represents changes in the former law of
New Mexico which the legislature believed were mandated by the
Equal Rights Amendment. Commentary shows that the drafters of
the Act expressly sought to require a written agreement between
66. 94 N.M. at 583, 613 P.2d at 725.
67. De Funiak & Vaughn, Why Community Property is so Misunderstood-Knowingits
Origins is the Key, 1 Comm. Prop. J. 97, 98 (1974).

68. Id.
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spouses to transmute community property to separate property. 6 9
The court of appeals could have found the requirement of a writing
in section 40-3-8(A)(5) consistent with section 47-1-16 by holding
that the latter provision applies in determining questions of initial
legal status of property, but not in determining questions of transmutation of property status between spouses. The court of appeals ignored legislative intent when it said that the Act created the impression of requiring a writing only as an indirect and unintended consequence of statutory definition. 7" It seems implausible to conclude
that section 47-1-16, passed eighteen years before the Act, precluded
a finding that the legislature meant to establish that requirement of a
writing when it passed the Community Property Act of 1973. The
issue of transmutation must be squarely resolved. The New Mexico
Bar Association and others should encourage the legislature to address
the transmutation questions in a comprehensive manner, to clarify
policy issues, and to amend the Community Property Act of 1973.
DOROTHY KAY CARTER

69. See Bingaman, supra note 1, at 3-4.
70. 94 N.M. at 580, 613 P.2d at 722.

